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Abstract
Inspired by the phenomenon of panic buying in the
face of the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper studies
the effect of information cherry-picked to signal
cooperation or noncooperation on outcomes of
Prisoner’s Dilemma games. The study explores the
question of how presenting polarized pieces of
information before decision making affects subjects’
behavior using anonymous, randomly-matched,
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games conducted
virtually on Amazon Mechanical Turk. With a
sample size of 243 observations, the study finds that
positive information aimed to increase confidence
in cooperation does not have any significant
relationship with Prisoner’s Dilemma games’
outcomes. On the other hand, the data suggests that
when subjects were presented with a negative piece
of information lowering their confidence in
cooperative behavior, they were 14.6 percentage
points less likely to cooperate, compared to people
in the control group who did not receive any
information other than the Dilemma’s rules. The
study also finds that certain income brackets, panic
buying experience during COVID-19, and taking
care of a dependent have positive relationships with
cooperative behavior.
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• The study includes two experiments in which
participants participate in a one-shot game of
prisoner’s dilemma.
• All participants participate anonymously in an
online survey. They do not meet, communicate,
or know of their game partners or other
participants in anyway.
• Each participant enter the game separately, get
introduced to the game, answer a quiz to
understand the game, choose their strategy (play
the game), and only learn of the outcomes after
they have completed every part of the study,
including the demographic survey at the end.
• The study paid participants a flat rate of $0.75 for
survey completion, and either of $0.75, $0.50,
$0.25, or $0 in bonus depending on their games’
outcome.
• To determine the outcome of the game, each
participant is randomly matched with another
partipant playing the same condition.
• If both participants cooperate, they each
receive $0.50 in bonus or $1 total.
• If both participants defect, they each receive
$0.25 in bonus or $0.50 total.
• If one cooperates while the other defects, the
cooperative player gets $0 in bonus, while the
defect player gets $0.75, or $0.75 in total.
• This design corresponds to the classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma:
• Assuming self-interest maximization, the
dominant strategy is to defect.
• If both players defect, this yields the least
social surplus ($0.50 in total).
• The socially optimal outcome is where both
players cooperate ($1 in total bonus).

RESULTS

CONCLUSION

• 56.45% of observations in the dependent variable
DECISION are cooperative.
• Twelve regressions were conducted to analyze
the effect of the independent variables. The main
independent variable is information priming –
positive prime, negative prime or no prime.
• Regressions results show that after controlling for
11 demographic factors, people are less likely to
cooperate if they received the negative priming
treatment compared to the priming treatment
before choosing a game strategy.
• Participants primed with negative information
were 14.6 percentage points less likely to
cooperate compared to people who did not
receive any priming information.
• Seven income brackets had significant marginal
effect on the decision to cooperate or defect
(compared to the base condition).
• Participants with household income of
$60,000 to under $70,000 a year were 46.7
percentage points more likely to cooperate
than people in the base bracket making less
than $10,000.
• Participants with household income of
$100,000 to under $150,000 a year were 47.4
percentage points more likely to cooperate
than people making less than $10,000.
• Participants who claim to be “not sure” if they
bought more goods during February and March
2020 were 28.3 and 37.5 percentage points more
likely to cooperate compared to people who did
panic-buy.
• Having a dependent during February and March
2020 was associated with 15.7 percentage points
increase in the likelihood to cooperate compared
with not having a dependent (with confidence
level of 95%).

• The statistically significant relationship between
the negative priming information and the
outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma partially
supports the a priori hypotheses.
• This shows that consuming negative
information regarding cooperation before
engaging in social dilemmas might induce
less
cooperation
(compared
to
not
consuming).
• This could be the starting point for further
research into ways to minimize the cherrypicking, sensationalization by the media that
might have worsened the panic buying
phenomenon in March and February of 2020.
• The positive priming information did not have a
statistically significant relationship with the
behavioral outcome’s marginal changes.
However, all the coefficients are positive,
meeting the expected direction of relationship
between the dependent and the independent
variable.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There is room for improvement with replication
and increasing of the sample size.
At the same time, there is possibility that
subjects react to positive and negative
information to differing degrees.
Apart from the sample size, the demographic of
the sample was also skewed with significantly
more male and white subjects for both
experiments. More tests should be conducted to
find out if this is due to Amazon Mechanical
Turk contractors’ demographic and if there are
tools to minimize the non-representative
sampling.
Significant relationships between decision
outcomes and demographic variables such as
income, having a dependent, and being married
also pose interesting future directions for
research.
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